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An introduction to private military companies 
 
The public-private dichotomy of warfare is crumbling down as governments are 
voluntarily surrendering one of the essential and defining attributes of statehood: the 




Private military companies are business organizations trading in professional services 
linked to warfare2. They are registered corporate bodies with legal personalities that 
provide military services, including combat operations, strategic planning, intelligence, 
risk assessment, operational support, training, and technical skills3. The private military, 
a concept largely unknown a decade ago is apparently here to stay. It is an industry with 




Private military companies deliver a wide spectrum of services that were once generally 
assumed to be exclusively inside the public context, thus breaking down what has long 
been seen as the traditional responsibilities of government5. Since the 1990's private 
military companies have been active in zones of conflict and transition throughout the 
world6. They have been critical players in several conflicts and are often the determinate 
actor with a strategic impact on both the process and outcome of conflicts7
                                                   
1 Working group on private military companies, “Private military firms - fact sheet”, Geneva,  DCAF 
(2004) at 1-2 available at 
.  The clients 
of these private military companies include a variety of actors, ranging from “ruthless 
dictators, morally depraved rebels and drug cartels” to “legitimate sovereign states, 
http://www.dcaf.ch/pfpc/proj_privmilitary.pdf [last consulted January 6, 2010] 
2 P.W. Singer, Corporate warriors: the rise of the privatized military industry, Cornell University Press, 
2004, at 8 
3 C. Beyani & D. Lilly, “Regulating private military companies: options for the UK government”, 
International Alert policy paper, at 16 available at http://www.international-alert.org/pdf/reg_pmc.PDF 
[last consulted January 3, 2010] 
4 P.R. Verkuil, Outsourcing sovereignty: why privatization of government functions threatens democracy 
and what we can do about it, Cambridge University Press, 2007, at 26 
5 P.W. Singer, supra note 2 

















The downsizing and modernization of armed forces following the end of the Cold War 
and the end of apartheid is one of the determining factors leading to the outsourcing of 
military functions to private military firms9. Since then, thousands of arms experts and 
former soldiers have been thrown on to the employment market and are now selling their 
services to the highest bidder10. Much of this manpower and expertise has been soaked 
up by the booming private military and security sector11
 
. 
In many areas, the power of private military companies has been used as much in 
support of state interests as against them12. The distinction between public and private 
functions has become blurred by the expansion of the private military industry, leading 
to a decreased role of the state in the security sphere13. By privatizing the use of force, 
the state's monopoly on the legitimate use of violence is broken14. Because of these 
evolutions, radical changes in military relationships are emerging15
 
.  
Developed economies mostly turn to the private military sector as a cost-effective way 
of procuring services16. In developing countries however, especially in African war-torn 
societies, it is often core functions of statehood that are contracted out due to the 
inability of the state to fulfill such functions17
                                                   
8 D. Brooks & H. Solomon, “From the editor's desk”, Conflict Trends (2000) at 1 available at 
. In these cases, states hire private military 
http://www.accord.org.za/downloads/ct/ct_2000_1.pdf [last consulted January 5, 2010] 
9 Working group on private military companies, supra note 1 
10 K. Silverstein, Private Warriors, Verso, London, 2000, p.vii 
11Working group on private military companies, supra note 1 
12 P.W. Singer, supra note 2, at 18 
13 J.L. Gómez del Prado, “Impact in human rights of private military and security companies’ activities”, 
at 1 available at 
http://www.privatesecurityregulation.net/files/Impact%20in%20Human%20Rights%20of%20Private%20
Military%20and%20Security%20Companies'%20Activities.pdf [last consulted January 03, 2010] 
14 C. Ortíz, “Regulating private military companies: States and the expanding business of commercial 
security provision”, at 205 available at 
http://www.privatemilitary.org/publications/ortiz_2004_regulating_private_military_companies.pdf [last 
consulted January 03, 2010] 
15 P.W. Singer, supra note 2, at18 
16 See Global Security website on mercenaries at 
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/para/mercenary.htm [last consulted January 03, 2010] 
17 J. Cilliers, “Private security in war-torn African states”, in: J. Cilliers & P. Mason (eds.), Peace, profit or 
















Some of these companies have committed serious abuses in the course of their 
operations, most of which have gone unpunished. This abuse raises questions as to how 
international law should apply to these companies, and how victims can find redress 
under international law19. When trying to find an answer to this question it becomes 
immediately apparent that the legal and regulatory issues surrounding private military 
companies are by no means clear20. Whereas international law, through the international 
mercenary conventions, seems to outlaw individuals selling private military services, it 




In this thesis I will assess the status of private military companies under current 
international humanitarian law and point out the inadequacies in the current international 
regulatory framework. Subsequently, I will address different regulatory options and 
formulate a response to the regulatory gaps left by the international regulatory 
framework in the form of a new international convention on private military companies.  
 
International humanitarian law is only applicable in situations of armed conflict and 
does not regulate acts of isolated violence or internal disturbances. Even though 
situations might arise where a private military company offers services both in and 
outside situations of conflict, this thesis will be restricted to the regulation of the status 
of private military companies in situations of armed conflict. Evidently, regulating the 
status of private military companies in armed conflict might also provide clarity about 
the legal status of these companies in a range of situations that do not surpass the 
threshold of armed conflict. 
                                                                                                                                                      
Studies, 1999, at 4-5 
18 Ibid. 
19 P.W.Singer, “War, profits, and the vacuum of law: privatized military firms and international law”, 42 
Colum. J. Transnat'l L. 521 (2004) at 524 
20 Ibid. 













Chapter I:  Categorizing and defining private actors in the military 
sector 
 
This chapter will discuss different attempts made by various authors to categorize or 
subdivide actors in the private military sector and point out why these distinctions are 
problematic. It further seeks to provide for a definition of private military companies 
that is workable under international humanitarian law. It does so while at the same time 
recognizing that the purpose of international humanitarian law is to limit the effects of 
armed conflict by protecting persons who are not, or are no longer, participating in the 
hostilities and by restricting the means and methods of warfare. 
 
It is clear that private military companies offer services of a sophisticated nature and of a 
wide range, that there is an apparent wide demand for their services from a host of actors 
and that their operations are often transnational22. However, because of a lack of 




Numerous authors have attempted to subdivide and categorize private actors in the 
military service sector. One distinction that is often put forward is that between private 
military companies and private security companies. A private military company is 
defined as a private company offering offensive services, designed to have a military 
impact on a given situation, and often contracted by governments24. Private security 
company refers to companies offering defensive services, intended to protect 
individuals and property, frequently used by multinational corporations in the extractive 
sector, humanitarian agencies, and individuals in situations of conflict or instability25
                                                   
22 K. Pech, “Executive Outcomes – A corporate conquest”, in: J. Cilliers & P. Mason (eds.), Peace, profit 
or plunder? The privatization of security in war-torn African societies, South Africa, Institute for Security 
Studies, 1999, at 83 
. 
23D. Brooks & H. Solomon, supra note 8 
24C. Holmqvist, “Private security companies: the case for regulation”, SIPRI Policy Paper series 9 (2005), 
at 5 available at http://books.sipri.org/product_info?c_product_id=191[last consulted January 5, 2010] ; 













Some scholars add a third category to this, nonlethal service providers26. These 




Such distinctions are problematic. First, what appears to be defensive may well turn out 
to have offensive repercussions28.  Furthermore, in certain conflict zones, without a front 
line or combat zone, keeping a service defensive is a virtually impossible task and once 
one allows the private military to enter the battlefield, combat support services can 
easily devolve into combat services29. Second, short-term situational demands as well as 
business opportunities lead companies to appropriate new tasks with relative speed and 
ease making the distinction between offensive and defensive irrelevant and misleading30. 
Furthermore, the distinction between offensive and defensive tells us little about the 
strategic value or impact of a particular task on a conflict31
 
.  
Similarly, some authors distinguish private military companies by their level of activity, 
differentiating between active firms and passive firms32
 
. This distinction however, is 
problematic on the same account as the distinction between private security companies 
and private military companies. Firstly, what is considered passive under one set of 
circumstances may well be active under another set of circumstances, and secondly, the 
lines between ‘passive’ and ‘active’ are easily blurred as firms seek out new business 
opportunities. 
Interestingly, Tim Spicer, founder of the private military company Sandline, when 
defining private military companies, precisely departs from the premise that private 
                                                   
26 See e.g. D. Brooks, “Private firms have a role to play in peace operations in Africa”, (2003) available at  
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/news/2003/10/mil-031022-usia06.htm [last consulted 
September 22, 2009] 
27 Ibid. 
28 C. Holmqvist, “Private military and security companies – an analytical overview”, in:  ICRC 
publication, Proceedings of the Bruges Colloquium: Private military/security companies operating in 
situations of armed conflict, ICRC, 2006, at 5 
29 P.R. Verkuil, supra note 4, at 27 
30C. Holmqvist, supra note 28 
31 Military or strategic impact can be significant also for services that are carried out in a classroom 
setting. The training provided by the US company MPRI to the Croatian army in 1995 is often cited in this 
respect, and arguably had a decisive impact on that conflict. See C. Holmqvist, supra note 28, at 13 












military companies provide more than just passive assistance33
 
. Private military 
companies, Spicer argues, 
“… are defined as those organizations which do more than provide passive assistance in 
areas of conflict. They may provide training and equipment to extend the capabilities of 
their client’s military resources, providing them with the strategic or operational 
advantage that is necessary to suppress their opposition or, going even further play an 
active role alongside the client forces, as force multipliers, deploying their own 
personnel in the field of conflict, but with the strict caveat that they are acting within the 
chain of command of the client’s military hierarchy”34
 
.  
Another distinction that is widely used is that made by Peter W. Singer, who identified 
three categories into which private military companies fall: military support firms, 
military consulting firms and military provider firms. Singer structures the industry 
using a ‘Tip of the Spear’ metaphor, distinguishing firms by their closeness to the actual 
fighting (the ‘front line’)35
 
.  
Military support firms provide their clients with logistics, intelligence, technical 
support, supply and transportation, thus specializing in secondary tasks that are not part 
of the overall core mission of the client36. Although they do not participate in the 
execution or planning of combat action, these companies fill functional needs critical to 
overall combat operations37. Military consulting firms provide advisory and training 
services integral to the operation and restructuring of a client's armed forces; they offer 
strategic, operational and organizational analysis38. These firms do not operate on the 
battlefield itself, even though their presence could possibly reshape the strategic and 
tactical environment through the re-engineering of a local force39
                                                   
33 Spicer thus goes far beyond the definition that other private military companies propose, as most of 
them vehemently argue that they do not participate in combat. See  J. Cilliers, supra note 17, at 2 
. Military provider 
firms focus on the tactical environment and are willing to engage directly in combat 
34 T. Spicer, “Private military companies - Independent or regulated?”, (1998) available at 
http://www.sandline.com/white/regulation.doc [last consulted September 21, 2009] 
35 P.W. Singer, supra note 2, at 89 
36 P.W. Singer, supra note 2, at 97 
37 Ibid. 

















However, Singer himself admits that companies sometimes cross sectors42. His attempt 
to distinguish private military firms according to their closeness to the battlefield is thus 
exposed to the same kind of critique other classifications endure. Furthermore, by 
classifying according to major services provided, Singer misses an important distinction 
for the purposes of international humanitarian law: whether private military companies 
engage in the use of force and whether they take a direct part in hostilities43. While 
Singer defines military provider firms by their willingness to engage in direct combat 
operations, it is also very likely that the personnel of a military support firms or a 
military consulting firm will engage in activities that can be qualified as direct 




As will be explained below45, the concept of direct participation in hostilities plays an 
important role in establishing the status of private military contractors. Under the 
Geneva Conventions and the Additional Protocols thereto, private military contractors, 
when qualified as civilians under international humanitarian law, loose certain 




Any definition of a private military company that blurs the lines as to when companies 
take a direct part in hostilities or which status attaches to private military contractors can 
be counterproductive for international humanitarian law47
                                                   
40 P.W. Singer, supra note 2, at 92 
. A workable definition thus 
has to be sufficiently broad to encompass the widest range of military companies 
41 Ibid. 
42 Ibid. 
43 R. Morgan, “Professional military firms under international law”, 9 Chi. J. Int'l L. 213 (2008) at 216 
44 Ibid. 
45 See Chapter II: The status of private military companies under international humanitarian law 
46 See Article 51 of the Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to 
the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts of 8 June 1977 (further: Additional Protocol I) 
47 L.D. Beck, “Private military companies under international humanitarian law”, in: C.Simon & 
C.Lenhardt (eds.), From mercenaries to market: the rise and regulation of private military companies, 












possible. For the purpose of this thesis, whenever the term private military company, 




“Private military companies are commercial enterprises that: 
- offer services directly involving the exercise of force by military means; 
- offer services potentially involving the exercise of force by military means; 
- transfer or enhance the potential to exercise force by military means to clients.” 
 
When a private military company offers services that clearly encompass direct 
participation in combat, the military character of the company does not leave much room 
for doubt. The potential to exercise force can materialize when rendering, for example, a 
vast array of protective services in climates of instability49. It is a potential to exercise 
force because the presence of a private military company can deter aggressors from 
considering the use of force as a viable course of action50. Transfer or enhancement of 
the potential to exercise force, on the other hand, occurs when delivering expert military 
training and other services such as logistics support, risk assessment, and intelligence 
gathering51
                                                   
48 Based on a definition proposed by Carlos Ortíz: C. Ortíz, “The private military company: an entity at 
the center of overlapping spheres of commercial activity and responsibility”, in: J.Thomas & K. Gerhard 
(eds.), Private Military and Security Companies. Chances, problems, pitfalls and prospects, Wiesbaden, 


















Chapter II:  The status of private military companies under 
international humanitarian law 
 
1. Introduction  
 
Whereas several hurdles exist in determining the status of private military companies 
and private military company employees, they do not operate in a legal vacuum. While 
the companies themselves are mostly unregulated under international humanitarian law, 
a range of international legal instruments covers the status of their employees. Under the 
logic of international humanitarian law, private military contractors are either civilians 
or combatants52
 
. However, given the way private military companies conduct their 
business, the existing rules are not easy to apply, creating a number of “legal grey 
zones”.   
On the outset, it is important to note that grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions of 
1949 and the Additional Protocols thereto are always punishable, regardless of the 
identity of the offender53
 
. The fact that states often hire private military companies does 
not preclude contractors from being held accountable for possible abuses. This being 
said however, due to the structure of these companies and the range of services they 
offer, they are surrounded by a  “legal murkiness” as a result of which abuses have gone 
largely unpunished. 
This chapter will set out to establish which legal instruments regulate the status of 
                                                   
52 This is made clear by Article 50 of Additional Protocol I. Furthermore, the ICRC commentary on Article 
4 of the Third Geneva Convention states that “every person in enemy hands must have some status under 
international law: he is either a prisoner of war and, as such, covered by the Third Convention, a civilian 
covered by the Fourth Convention, or again, a member of the medical personnel of the armed forces who 
is covered by the First Convention. There is no intermediate status.” 
53 The four Geneva Conventions and Protocol 1 each have a definition of what constitutes grave breaches. 
See Article 50 of the First Geneva Convention, Article 51 of the Second Geneva Convention, Article 130 
of the Third Geneva Convention, Article 147 of the Fourth Geneva Convention and Articles 11 and 85 of 












private military companies and their employees and will discuss the consequences that 
attach to such status. It will also point out where these different legal instruments fail to 
establish clear criteria for determining such status and where legal uncertainties 
surrounding such status exist.  
 
2. The Montreux document on private military and security companies 
 
The “Montreux Document on Pertinent International Legal Obligations and Good 
Practices for States related to Operations of Private Military and Security Companies 
during Armed Conflict”54 (Montreux document) is the product of an initiative launched 
by the Swiss government in cooperation with the International Committee of the Red 
Cross (ICRC). The document was developed in meetings convened in January and 
November 2006, November 2007, and April and September 2008 with the participation 
of governmental experts from Afghanistan, Angola, Australia, Austria, Canada, China, 
France, Germany, Iraq, Poland, Sierra Leone, South Africa, Sweden, Switzerland, the 
United Kingdom, Ukraine, and the United States.  During the drafting process, several 
consultations with representatives from civil society and of the private military and 
security industry took place55
 
. 
As a whole, the Montreux document expresses the consensus that international law, in 
particular international humanitarian law and human rights law, does have a bearing on 
private military companies and that there is no legal vacuum for their activities56. The 
document intends to serve as a guide on the legal and practical issues raised by private 
military and security companies57. In so doing, it recalls existing legal obligations of 
states, private military companies and their personnel58
                                                   
54 Montreux Document on Pertinent International Legal Obligations and Good Practices for States related 
to Operations of Private Military and Security Companies during Armed Conflict of 17 September 2008, 
UN doc. Nr. A/63/476 - S/2008/636  
. It does not create new 
55 See ICRC website: http://www.icrc.org/web/eng/siteeng0.nsf/htmlall/montreux-document-170908 
56 See website of the Swiss Federal Department of Foreign Affairs at 
http://www.eda.admin.ch/eda/en/home/topics/intla/humlaw/pse/psechi.html [last consulted September 23, 
2009] 
57 Ibid. 











obligations and is itself a legally non-binding document59
 
.  
Even though the Montreux document is a “soft law” document, it still has significant 
value as it has the potential to be the forerunner to binding hard law. The exact meaning 
of “soft law” is discussed in legal literature, but most authors seem to agree that the 
conclusion of non-binding instruments offers a range of advantages, such as greater 
flexibility, lower sovereignty costs and the availability of these instruments to non-state 
actors60. “Soft law” documents can be the first step in a treaty making process, or they 
can influence state practice, which will help generate customary norms61
 
. Because of 
this potential, I will discuss the Montreux document rather extensively in this thesis. 
The Montreux document consists of two parts. Part one provides a conservative 
statement of lex lata and was drafted relying on traditional international law sources 
(treaties such as the Geneva Conventions and authoritative interpretations such as the 
ICRC study on Customary International Law and statements by United Nations (UN) 
human rights bodies)62. It differentiates between contracting states, territorial states and 
home states and recalls pertinent international legal obligations according to 
international humanitarian law and human rights law for each of those categories. The 
document also addresses the question of attribution of private conduct to the state under 
customary international law. In addition, it devotes sections to the pertinent international 
legal obligations of all other states, to the duties of private military companies and their 
personnel, as well as to questions of superior responsibility63
 
Part two of the Montreux document does not state law, but provides a non-exhaustive 
compendium of illustrative good practices for states discharging their existing legal 
.  
                                                   
59 Montreux document, supra note 54,  at preface, para 3 
60 G.C. Shaffer & M.A. Pollack, “Hard  vs. soft law: alternatives, complements and antagonists in 
international governance”, University of Minnesota Legal Studies Research Paper Series 09-23 at 8 
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1426123 [last consulted January 6, 2010] 
61 G.C. Shaffer & M.A. Pollack, supra note 60, at 16 
62 J. Cockayne, “Regulating private military and security companies: the content, negotiation, weakness 
and promise of the Montreux document”, 13 J. Conflict & Security L. 401 (2008) at 404 
63 See website of the Swiss Federal Department of Foreign Affairs at 













obligations64. It was drafted with references to corporate codes of conduct, national 
legislation, administrative instruments and regional political statements65. Part two also 
differentiates between contracting states, territorial states and home states and proposes a 
range of good practices for every category. These good practices vary from introducing 
transparent licensing regimes to ensuring better supervision and accountability so that 
only private military companies likely to respect international humanitarian law through 








“The status of the personnel of private military and security companies is determined by 
international humanitarian law, on a case by case basis, in particular according to the nature and 
circumstances of the functions in which they are involved. 
 
If they are civilians under international humanitarian law, the personnel of private military and 
security companies may not be the object of attack, unless and for such time as they directly 
participate in hostilities. 
 
The personnel of private military and security companies: 
 
a) Are obliged, regardless of their status, to comply with applicable international 
humanitarian law; 
b) Are protected as civilians under international humanitarian law, unless they are 
incorporated into the regular armed forces of a State or are members of organized armed 
forces, groups or units under a command responsible to the State; or otherwise lose their 
protection as determined by international humanitarian law; 
c) Are entitled to prisoner of war status in international armed conflict if they are persons 
accompanying the armed forces meeting the requirements of Article 4A(4) of the Third 
Geneva Convention; 
                                                   
64 J. Cockayne, supra note 62, at 405 
65 Ibid. 
66 See website of the Swiss Federal Department of Foreign Affairs at 
http://www.eda.admin.ch/eda/en/home/topics/intla/humlaw/pse/psechi.html [last consulted September 23, 
2009] 












d) To the extent they exercise governmental authority, have to comply with the State’s 
obligations under international human rights law; 
e) Are subject to prosecution if they commit conduct recognized as crimes under applicable 
national or international law.” 
 
Hence, the document merely reiterates that the status of private military contractors is 
determined by international humanitarian law and does not provide greater clarity as to 
when the personnel of private military companies should qualify either as a combatant or 
as a civilian. The difficulties in determining status under international humanitarian law 
and the consequences that attach to being qualified as either a combatant or a civilian are 
set out below.  
 
There is no doubt that the Montreux document constitutes a very important contribution 
to the discussion on the activities of private military companies. However, only a limited 
number of states have endorsed the document, and the document itself stresses that it is 
not legally binding. It is merely a promotional declaration of intentions and it lacks 
binding mechanisms68. The UN working group on the use of mercenaries as a means of 
violating human rights and impeding the exercise of the right of peoples to self-
determination69 made a detailed study on the Montreux document and notes that it only 
represents part of the wide spectrum of countries and their approaches70. The Working 
Group considers the document useful in identifying existing obligations of states, private 
military companies and their personnel under international humanitarian and human 
rights law, and agrees that the good practices section could prove to be a useful tool for 
setting out guidelines on private military companies71
                                                   
68 J.L. Gómez del Prado, “Private military and security companies and the UN working group on the use 
of mercenaries”, 13 J. Conflict & Security L. 429 (2008) at 445 
. Whereas it sees the document as a 
good promotional document on international humanitarian law, the Working Group does 
69 Established in 2005 by resolution 2005/2 of 7 April 2005 by the former UN Commission on human 
rights, specifically ‘to monitor and study the effects of the activities of private companies offering military 
assistance, consultancy and security services on the international market on the enjoyment of human 
rights, particularly the rights of peoples to self-determination, and to prepare draft international basic 
principles that encourage respect for human rights on the part of those companies in their activities’. 
(Further: Working Group on mercenaries) See: J.LGómez del Prado, supra note 68, at 429-430 
70 Report to the 10th session of the Human Rights Council, Report of the Working Group on the use of 
mercenaries as a means of violating human rights and impeding the exercise of the right of peoples to self-
determination of 2009, A/HRC/10/14,  para 43 (Further: Report of the Working Group on mercenaries of 
2009) 












find that it has failed to address existing regulatory gaps72
 
.   
The document has, inter alia, failed to provide greater clarity on the status of private 
military contractors under international humanitarian law, thus leaving existing “grey 
zones” of the law untouched. The document does not address the responsibility of the 
State with respect to the conduct of private military companies73, it does not indicate that 
States should enforce existing laws, nor does it provide for a centralized system that 
would be responsible for registering of contracts or for licensing of private military 
companies74. Furthermore, the document does not provide sufficient clarity in respect of 
jurisdictional issues that may come up when prosecuting private military contractors 
who have committed abuses abroad. In addition, there should be clear acknowledgement 
of state responsibility to ensure respect for international humanitarian law including 
obligations regarding prevention, protection, investigation and prosecution and 
enforcement of appropriate sanctions and remedial measures75
 
. 
3. Civilians or combatants under the Geneva Conventions and the 
Additional Protocols thereto 
a. Introduction 
 
Under the logic of the Geneva Conventions and the Additional Protocols thereto 
individuals are either qualified as combatants or as civilians76. Knowing which status a 
private military contractor has is essential for a number of reasons77
                                                   
72 Report of the Working Group on mercenaries of 2009, supra note 70, at para 44 
. Firstly, opposing 
73 Whereas the text references the responsibility of contracting states when acts of a private military 
company are directly attributable to the state,  it does not specify that the state may also have 
responsibilities in respect of the conduct of a private military company with which it contracts, 
independent of whether or not the contractual relationship creates any level of state attribution. See 
Amnesty International public statement on the Montreux Document available at 
http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/asset/IOR30/010/2008/en/5b351e3e-99de-11dd-bf88-
f59215f3db50/ior300102008en.html [last consulted Sept.28, 2009] 
74 Report of the Working Group on mercenaries of 2009, supra note 70, at para 44 and 47 
75 See Amnesty International public statement on the Montreux Document available at 
http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/asset/IOR30/010/2008/en/5b351e3e-99de-11dd-bf88-
f59215f3db50/ior300102008en.html [last consulted Sept.28, 2009] 
76 Cfr. supra note 52 
77 L. Cameron, “Private military companies: their status under international humanitarian law and its 












forces must know whether they are legitimate military objectives and whether they can 
attack them lawfully, as only combatants or civilians who take a direct part in hostilities 
can lawfully be made the object of attack78. Secondly, in order to establish the set of 
protections they are entitled to upon capture. Combatants enjoy prisoner of war status, 
whereas civilians enjoy an entirely different set of protections79. Thirdly, in order to 
know whether private military personnel can lawfully participate in hostilities, as this 
“privilege” belongs to combatants only80.  And finally, to know whether private military 
employees who do participate in hostilities may be prosecuted for doing so, as only 
civilians who take a direct part in hostilities can be prosecuted for taking up arms81
 
.  
There is no straightforward answer as to whether or not members of private military 
companies fall within one or another category82. Any assessment must be pragmatic and 
look at the functions private military contractors perform, the closeness of these 
functions to military activities, and the existence of chains of command or affiliations83
 
.  
Furthermore, it is important to recall that the status of “combatant” does not exist in non-
international armed conflicts. In a non-international armed conflict, members of armed 
groups are not combatants and they do not have the right to prisoner-of-war status upon 
capture. In non-international armed conflict, domestic law rather than international law 
determines the status of private military contractors, and states could potentially 
prosecute civilian contractors for taking up arms84
                                                   
78 See Article 51 of Additional Protocol I 
. Because of this, the protections 
79 The protections applicable to combatants upon capture are laid down in the Third Geneva Convention 
on prisoners-of-war, and supplemented by Article 44 and 45 of Additional Protocol I, whereas the 
protections available to civilians that are captured are throughout the Fourth Geneva Convention and are 
supplemented by the fundamental guarantees provided for in Article 75 of Additional Protocol I. 
80 This privilege derives from Article 43(2) of Additional Protocol I. See L. Cameron, “International 
humanitarian law and the regulation of private military companies”, Basel Institute on Governance at 3 
available at http://www.baselgovernance.org/fileadmin/docs/pdfs/Nonstate/Cameron.pdf [last consulted 
January 6, 2010]; K. Dörmann, “The legal situation of unlawful/unpriviliged combatants”, 85 ICRC 
Review 849 (2003), at 45 
81 Article 51 (3) of Additional Protocol I indicates this. See L. Cameron, supra note 77, at 582 
82 J. Williamson, “Private security companies and private military companies under international 
humanitarian law”, in S. Gumedze (ed.), Private security in Africa. Manifestation, challenges and 
regulation, ISS Monograph Series 139,  2007 at 92 available at: 
http://www.issafrica.org/index.php?link_id=&slink_id=5218&link_type=13&slink_type=12&tmpl_id=3 
[last consulted September  30, 2009] 
83 J. Williamson, supra note 82 
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afforded by international humanitarian law in non-international armed conflict depend 
primarily on the distinction between those who take a direct part in hostilities and those 
who do not85. The provisions on treatment of captured persons in non-international 
armed conflicts are far less detailed than those that apply in international conflict as only 
common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions and Additional Protocol II provide for 
basic protections in these types of conflicts86
 
.  
Given the lack of distinction between civilians and combatants in non-international 
armed conflicts, the next part of this thesis will mainly focus on the status of private 
military contractors in international armed conflict. Firstly, I set out the conditions under 
which private military contractors qualify as combatants or as civilians, as well as the 
legal implications that stem from this qualification. In the section on civilians, I 
elaborate upon the concept of direct participation. Thus, this section also holds relevance 
for private military contractors operating in non-international armed conflict. Secondly, I 
touch upon the special case of civilians accompanying the armed forces. Lastly, I lay out 




Article 4 of the Third Geneva Convention identifies three different categories of persons 
entitled to prisoner of war status. In identifying those eligible for prisoner of war status, 
Article 4 lays out the core elements of lawful combatant status87
 
.  
The first category encompasses “Members of the armed forces of a Party to the conflict 
as well as members of militias or volunteer corps forming part of such armed forces”. 
Where private military companies have been formally incorporated in the army, they 
would surely be covered by this provision88
                                                                                                                                                      
http://www.icrc.org/web/eng/siteeng0.nsf/html/pmc-article-310804
. Generally, however, states do not often 
incorporate private contractors in the army, as the purpose of hiring the services of 
 [last consulted October 2, 2009]  
85 Ibid. 
86 L.D. Beck, supra note 47, at 127 
87 C. Mandernach, “Warriors without law: embracing a spectrum of status for military actors”, 7 
Appalachian J.L. 137 (2007) at 145 












private military contractors is often precisely to avoid certain responsibilities they bear 
for members of the armed forces89. Nonetheless, it is not inconceivable that private 
military companies are formally incorporated, as this policy is entirely dependent on the 
will of the contracting state90
 
.  
A second category, not relevant for our purposes, includes “inhabitants of a non-
occupied territory, who on the approach of the enemy spontaneously take up arms to 
resist the invading forces” (a so-called levée en masse)91
 
.  
The third category, which is most relevant for our purposes, is contained in Article 4.A 
(2) of the Third Geneva Convention and reads as follows: 
 
“Members of other militias and members of other volunteer corps, including those of organized 
resistance movements, belonging to a Party to the conflict and operating in or outside their own 
territory, even if this territory is occupied, provided that such militias or volunteer corps, including 
such organized resistance movements, fulfill the following conditions: 
 
        (a) That of being commanded by a person responsible for his subordinates; 
        (b) That of having a fixed distinctive sign recognizable at a distance; 
        (c) That of carrying arms openly; 
        (d) That of conducting their operations in accordance with the laws and customs of war.” 
 
Even though Article 4.A (2) confers per se combatant status to members of a party’s 
armed forces, all members of the armed forces must respect the above conditions of 
lawful combat in order to enjoy the protections of international humanitarian law92. 
These four criteria are essential to qualify as a lawful combatant93
 
.  
For private military contractors to qualify as combatants under this third category, a 
certain link with the state for which they operate is necessary, as Article 4.A(2) of the 
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90 L. Cameron, supra note 77, at 583 
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Third Geneva Convention requires that they “belong to a party to the conflict”94. On this 
requirement, the ICRC Commentary to the Geneva Conventions states that “It is 
essential that there should be a de facto relationship between the [...] organization and 
the party [to the conflict], but the existence of this relationship is sufficient. It may find 
expression merely by tacit agreement, if the operations are such as to indicate clearly for 
which side the resistance organization is fighting”95. Private military companies could 
thus fall within this category if a de facto link exists to the state hiring them. This 




In those cases where Additional Protocol I is applicable97
 
, Article 43 of the Protocol 
provides for another definition of armed forces, stating that: 
“1. The armed forces of a Party to a conflict consist of all organized armed forces, groups and units 
which are under a command responsible to that Party for the conduct of its subordinates, even if 
that Party is represented by a government or an authority not recognized by an adverse Party. Such 
armed forces shall be subject to an internal disciplinary system, which, 'inter alia', shall enforce 
compliance with the rules of international law applicable in armed conflict. 
 
2. Members of the armed forces of a Party to a conflict (other than medical personnel and chaplains 
covered by Article 33 of the Third Convention) are combatants, that is to say, they have the right to 
participate directly in hostilities.” 
 
Contrary to the Third Geneva Convention, Additional Protocol I no longer differentiates 
between the “regular armed forces” and “other armed groups”98
                                                   
94 L.D. Beck, supra note 47, at 118-119 
. Regardless of the 
inclusion of “other armed groups” in the definition of combatant, experts are not 
unanimous on whether members of private military companies would qualify as 
95 J. Pictet (ed.), Commentary to the Geneva Convention relative to the treatment of prisoners of war, 
Geneva, ICRC, 1960, at 57  
96 L.D. Beck, supra note 47, at 119 
97At present, 168 States are party to Additional Protocol I and it has thus almost reached universal 
acceptation. However, a number of States known to use private military companies, or on whose territory 
private military companies are active, have not yet become party to the Protocol. Notable examples are the 
United States and Iraq. 












combatants under Article 43 of Additional Protocol I99
 
.  
The crucial requirement under Article 43 is that the group be “under a command 
responsible” to a party to the conflict. According to some experts, the present inability of 
many States to subject members of a private military company to their criminal 
jurisdiction would preclude the applicability of Article 43100. Others submit that in order 
for a private military company to constitute the “armed forces” of a State, or part of it, 
under Article 43 the State would formally have to incorporate a private military 
company into its armed forces by adopting domestic legislation placing the private 
military company under the command of the State’s armed forces101. However, in light 
of the way in which Article 43 sought to broaden and simplify the definition of “armed 
forces”, some experts are in favor of a functional approach and argue that whether a 
group is part of the “armed forces” depends primarily on whether the group is fighting 
on behalf a party to the conflict102. This suggests that a factual link to the regular armed 
forces would be sufficient and if a private military company is hired by a belligerent 
state, it is then acting on behalf of the party to the conflict103
 
. 
In short, it is insufficiently clear when private military contractors qualify as combatants 
under the Geneva Conventions and the Additional Protocols thereto. It is obvious that 
they might qualify as such under certain circumstances, but there is a lack of clear 
guidelines on the matter and experts disagree on the meaning of the current legal 
instruments regulating combatant status. 
 
c.      Civilians 
 
Since every person must be either a combatant or a civilian, according to the logic of 
international humanitarian law, when private military company employees are not 
                                                   
99 Ibid. 
100 Report of the expert meeting on private military contractors: status and state responsibility for their 
actions, University Centre for international humanitarian law, Geneva, 2005 at 9 available at 
http://www.adh-geneve.ch/pdfs/2rapport_compagnies_privees.pdf [last consulted September 30, 2009] 
101 Ibid. at 12  
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combatants they are civilians104
 
. Whereas the Geneva Convention contains no definition 
of a civilian, Article 50 of Additional Protocol I provides that “a civilian is any person 
who does not belong to one of the categories of persons referred to in Article 4 A (1), 
(2), (3) and (6) of the Third Geneva Convention and in Article 43 of this Protocol. In 
case of doubt whether a person is a civilian, that person shall be considered to be a 
civilian”. 
At the same time Article 51 Additional Protocol I states that “civilians shall enjoy the 
protection afforded by this Section, unless and for such time as they take a direct part in 




Establishing which activities amount to “taking a direct part in hostilities” is thus 
essential when determining which protections might apply to private military 
contractors106. However, international humanitarian law treaties do not provide a 
definition on the activities that constitute direct participation107. The ICRC Commentary 
on Additional Protocol I gives more guidance, where it defines direct participation as 
“acts of war which by their nature or purpose are likely to cause actual harm to the 
personnel and equipment of the enemy armed forces”108
 
. 
As mentioned above, determining what amounts to direct participation in hostilities is 
also crucial in non-international armed conflict, as the distinction between combatants 
and civilians does not exist in these types of conflicts. Thus, as is the case in 
international armed conflicts, the concept of direct participation is also crucial in non-
international armed conflict when determining the protections applicable to private 
military contractors who are active in these types of conflicts. 
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A series of expert meetings on direct participation in hostilities under international law 
revisited the matter109. The expert process, conducted by the ICRC from 2003 to 2008, 
eventually led to an institutional publication by the ICRC providing interpretive 
guidance on direct participation in hostilities110
 
.  
According to this publication, a specific act must meet the following three cumulative 
criteria in order to qualify as direct participation in hostilities. Firstly, the act must meet 
a threshold regarding the harm likely to result from it, meaning it must be likely to 
adversely affect the military operations or military capacity of a party to an armed 
conflict or, alternatively, to inflict death, injury, or destruction on persons or objects 
protected against direct attack111. Secondly, a relationship of direct causation between 
the act and the expected harm is required112. Thirdly, a belligerent nexus must exist 
between the act and the hostilities conducted, meaning the act must be specifically 
designed to directly cause the required threshold of harm in support of a party to the 
conflict and to the detriment of another party113
 
. 
The attempts by the ICRC to provide greater clarity on the issue of direct participation 
are certainly laudable, but the actions of private military contractors will have to be 
assessed on a case to case basis until states further these efforts and adopt binding rules 
clarifying which activities amount to direct participation in hostilities. The difficulties 
surrounding the issue lead to uncertainty as to what set of repercussions civilian private 
military contractors might expect from their actions in armed conflict, as prosecution is 
possible for direct participation in the war effort. 
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available at 
http://www.issafrica.org/index.php?link_id=&slink_id=5218&link_type=13&slink_type=12&tmpl_id=3 
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d. Civilians accompanying the armed forces 
 
Whereas private military contractors that fall into the civilian category would generally 
not be entitled to prisoner of war status upon capture, the Third Geneva Convention 
provides for an exception in Article 4.A (4) where it gives such status to114
 
:  
“Persons who accompany the armed forces without actually being members thereof, such as 
civilian members of military aircraft crews, war correspondents, supply contractors, members of 
labour units or of services responsible for the welfare of the armed forces provided that they have 
received authorization from the armed forces which they accompany, who shall provide them for 
that purpose with an identity card.” 
 
This provision reflects the fact that certain persons exercising “support” functions, even 
though they are not part of the army, have traditionally accompanied armies115. If states 
employ private military contractors in such a “support” function, without requiring 
contractors to fight, they will most likely fall under this provision116. If, however, private 






Private military contractors might be qualified as mercenaries if they fall within the 
definition thereof. Three different legal instruments provide a definition of mercenary: 
Article 47 of Additional Protocol I, the Organization of African Union (OAU) 
Convention on the Elimination of Mercenarism in Africa of 1977118 and the UN 
International Convention against the Recruitment, Use, Financing and Training of 
Mercenaries of 1989119
                                                   
114 L.D. Beck, supra note 47, at 123 
. 
115 L.D. Beck, supra note 47, at 124 
116 Ibid. 
117 Ibid. 
118 The African Convention on Mercenarism was signed in Libreville on 3 July 1977 and entered into 
effect on 22 April 1985. Available at: http://www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf/FULL/485?OpenDocument [last 
consulted October 3, 2009] 













Both of the international conventions on mercenaries aim to prohibit the use of 
mercenaries and to criminalize both the resort to mercenaries and participation in 
hostilities as a mercenary120. International humanitarian law on the other hand does not 
outright prohibit the use of mercenaries, nor does it criminalize their activities121. 
However, it does provide a sanction for mercenaries in the case they are captured122. 
Under Additional Protocol I, a mercenary does not have the right to be a combatant or a 
prisoner of war123
 
.  Mercenaries get similar treatment as civilians who take a direct part 
in hostilities. A mercenary who forfeits his right to be a prisoner of war still has the right 
to certain basic protections of the Fourth Geneva Convention as well as the fundamental 
guarantees laid down in Article 75 of Additional Protocol I. 
Article 47.2 of Additional Protocol I defines a mercenary as any person who: 
 
“(a) is specially recruited locally or abroad in order to fight in an armed conflict; 
(b) does, in fact, take a direct part in the hostilities; 
(c) is motivated to take part in the hostilities essentially by the desire for private gain and, in fact, is 
promised, by or on behalf of a Party to the conflict, material compensation substantially in excess 
of that promised or paid to combatants of similar ranks and functions in the armed forces of that 
Party; 
(d) is neither a national of a Party to the conflict nor a resident of territory controlled by a Party to 
the conflict; 
(e) is not a member of the armed forces of a Party to the conflict; and 
(f) has not been sent by a State which is not a Party to the conflict on official duty as a member of 
its armed forces.” 
 
Even though some private contractors may arguably qualify as mercenaries under this 
definition124
                                                   
120 E. Gillard, supra note 106,  at 2 
, it is widely accepted that almost every private contractor is able to exclude 
himself from at least one of the requirements under Additional Protocol I. Given that the 
requirements are cumulatively applicable, an alleged mercenary could thus easily 
121 Ibid. 
122 Ibid. 
123 Article 47.1 of Additional Protocol I 
124 For an overview of the different requirement and the possibility of private contractors to meet with 
them see Z. Salzman, “Private military contractors and the taint of a mercenary reputation”, 40 N.Y.U. J. 












exclude himself from mercenary status.  
 
Firstly, the requirement that a mercenary has to be specially recruited to fight in an 
armed conflict could be rebutted in all cases where personnel of private companies are 
permanent employees125. Arguably, they are not recruited specifically to fight in armed 
conflict, but to serve in another capacity as “an employee of the company”. Secondly, 
the requirement that mercenaries be motivated by financial gain and receive 
substantially more pay than ordinary soldiers, is also easily avoided. Not all private 
military contractors receive substantially more pay than ordinary soldiers do, and, in 
addition, an alleged mercenary could easily claim he or she was not fighting for money 
but for ideological reasons instead126. Thirdly, requiring that a mercenary is a foreign 
national is also problematic. Nationals of a country may act against their own country in 
return for payment from a third country or organization127. Nationals could thus be hired 
with the purpose of employing them as mercenaries, but their use as such could be 
hidden behind their status as nationals128. Furthermore, it has been submitted that “it is 
not at all clear whether the condition of being neither a national of a party to the conflict 
nor a resident of a territory controlled by a Party to the conflict applies to a private 
military company's state of incorporation (in which case all its members would be 




The definition that was adopted in Additional Protocol I was mainly based on the 
definition that was provided in the OAU Convention on the Elimination of mercenarism 
of 1977, which defines a mercenary as any person who130
 
: 
“(a) is specially recruited locally or abroad in order to fight in an armed conflicts; 
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(b) does in fact take a direct part in the hostilities; 
(c) is motivated to take part in the hostilities essentially by the desire for private gain and in fact is 
promised by or on behalf of a party to the conflict material compensation; 
(d) is neither a national of a party to the conflict nor a resident of territory controlled by a party to 
the conflicts; 
(e) is not a member of the armed forces of a party to the conflict; and 
(f) is not sent by a state other than a party to the conflict on official mission as a member of the 
armed forces of the said state.” 
 
Even though the OAU convention is applicable in all armed conflicts, the convention, 
due to its regional nature, is only open to African states and only has 30 state parties to 
it. Furthermore, the convention does not completely forbid the recruitment of 
mercenaries. Article one only prohibits, governments, or any other groups, from 
employing mercenaries to defend themselves from those actions carried out by a 
liberation movement that the OAU recognizes131
 
. 
In 1989, the UN adopted the International Convention against the Recruitment, Use, 
Financing and Training of Mercenaries. Under the UN convention, a mercenary is any 
person who: 
 
“(a) Is specially recruited locally or abroad in order to fight in an armed conflict; 
(b) Is motivated to take part in the hostilities essentially by the desire for private gain and, in fact, is 
promised, by or on behalf of a party to the conflict, material compensation substantially in excess 
of that promised or paid to combatants of similar rank and functions in the armed forces of that 
party; 
(c) Is neither a national of a party to the conflict nor a resident of territory controlled by a party to 
the conflict; 
(d) Is not a member of the armed forces of a party to the conflict; and 
(e) Has not been sent by a State which is not a party to the conflict on official duty as a member of 




                                                   
131 C. Kinsey, “International law and the control of mercenaries and private military companies”, Culture 













A mercenary is also any person who, in any other situation: 
“(a) Is specially recruited locally or abroad for the purpose of participating in a concerted act of 
violence 
aimed at : 
 
(i) Overthrowing a Government or otherwise undermining the constitutional order of a State; or 
(ii) Undermining the territorial integrity of a State; 
 
(b) Is motivated to take part therein essentially by the desire for significant private gain and is 
prompted by the promise or payment of material compensation; 
(c) Is neither a national nor a resident of the State against which such an act is directed; 
(d) Has not been sent by a State on official duty; and 
            (e) Is not a member of the armed forces of the State on whose territory the act is undertaken.”  
 
The UN convention provides two alternate definitions of a mercenary in article one and 
is thus more widely applicable than Additional Protocol I in the sense that it extends to 
all armed conflicts and other situations in which they undermine a State government. 
However, the convention has only 32 State Parties to it and thus very limited utility.  
 
Where some of the definitional elements of the conventions differ from Additional 
Protocol I, an alleged mercenary could still escape falling under the definition132.  For 
example, under the conventions there is no requirement to show that the material 
compensation a mercenary receives is somehow excessive, this section could still be 




It follows that the international conventions that address mercenarism are largely 
ineffective because they do not receive broad support134
                                                   
132 S. Franklin, supra note 126, at 257 
. In addition, the rules are 
unlikely to become norms under customary international law, as extensive state practice 
133 M. Scheimer, “Seperating private military companies from illegal mercenaries in international law: 
proposing and international convention for legitimate military and security support that reflects customary 
international law”, 24 Am. U. Int'l L. Rev. 609 (2009) at 630 
134 K. Govern & E. Bales, “Taking shots at private military firms: international law misses its mark 












exists against them135. Then again, even if there was broader consensus and even if the 
conventions represented the will of the international community, the cumulative 
requirements of the various mercenary definitions lead to virtual inapplicability of these 
instruments to private military companies136
                                                   
135 Ibid. 
. The same applies to the Article 47 of 
Additional Protocol I. Even though there is significantly more support for the Protocol 
than for the international conventions regulating mercenarism, it is very unlikely that 














Chapter III:  The need for a new international convention on 




As amply illustrated above, international humanitarian law does not provide sufficient 
guidance on the status of private military companies. Neither the Geneva Conventions 
and the Additional Protocols thereto, nor the conventions on mercenaries provide a 
straightforward answer as to what status attaches to private military companies and what 
consequences attach thereto. The blurred distinction between combatants and civilians 
leads to a situation where private military contractors often operate in a legal “grey 
zone” where they are not held accountable for possible abuses. 
 
On one end of the spectrum, there are those who wish to ban private military companies 
completely. In this chapter, I argue that a ban is both unrealistic and undesirable. On the 
other hand, there are those who wish to leave the status quo of the law and rely 
completely on the self-regulatory capacity of the industry and accountability under 
contract. I will show however that neither of these options provides for sufficient 
guarantees against possible abuses. Some states have put national legislation in place to 
remedy the lack of regulation on the international level, but due to the transnational 
character of these companies they can easily evade responsibility by relocating 
themselves to a state that has no, or less stringent, regulations in place. Consequently, 
private military companies need regulation on the international level. Whereas some 
argue in favor of adapting the mercenary conventions, I will argue that a new convention 














2. A complete ban of private military companies is both unrealistic and 
undesirable 
 
Some critics of the provision of military services by private firms have argued that 
private military companies should be completely banned, and that the provision of 
military services should be renationalized137. However, the worldwide use of private 
military companies shows that a ban is unrealistic and would “work against the aim of 
greater transparency and accountability in the private military sector by increasing the 
likelihood that the industry would be pushed underground” 138. In addition, those states 
that already rely on the services of private military companies are not likely to give 
political support to an international ban of these companies139. States that are involved 
with private military companies, be it as a state of incorporation or as an active user of 
these companies, are already putting regulations in place rather than outright prohibiting 
these firms140. State practice thus seems to be on the side of the private military firms141. 
Peter W. Singer argues that “the fact that private military companies operate in over fifty 
states, often on behalf of governments, suggests a basis for arguing a norm of their 
legitimacy and a general acceptance of the phenomenon”142
 
. 
Even if a ban of private military companies would be realistic, it is undesirable143. 
Indeed, private military companies are a potentially powerful resource and an efficient 
government might be better off relying on them144. These companies might enhance 
cost-effectiveness and be more flexible or more efficient than the regular army145
 
.   
In addition, private military companies could make a valuable contribution to 
international security. Given that private military companies already provide security 
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and support to international and intergovernmental organizations, some argue that 
private military companies could improve the quality of UN missions146. Governments 
with capable militaries often show little interest in joining multilateral interventions into 
conflicts that are not of “political value” to them147. This often leads to troops from 
developing countries engaging in some of the world’s most difficult military operations, 
without having received adequate training or equipment148. Contracting out to private 
military contractors ensures that governments do not have to risk incurring the political 
costs associated with sending peacekeeping troops into situations that receive little 
understanding or support domestically149. Furthermore, one of the operational challenges 
that the UN faces is the promptness with which it can deploy troops150
 
. Making use of 
private military contractors could greatly accelerate setting up UN missions. 
As I will explain in the next paragraphs, the shift in focus on the matter by the UN 
Special Rapporteur on the use of mercenaries and the UN Working Group on 
Mercenaries constitutes further evidence of the fact that the international community is 
moving away from an outright ban on private military companies. 
 
In 1987, a UN Special Rapporteur of the Commission on Human Rights on the use of 
mercenaries as a means of impeding the exercise of the right of peoples to self-
determination was established. The role of the Special Rapporteur has been to document 
instances where mercenaries have been involved or implicated in human rights abuses 
and bring these instances to the attention of the international community when he reports 
to the UN General Assembly and the Commission on Human Rights151
                                                   
146 Ibid. at 81 
. As states did not 
adopt the UN convention on Mercenaries until 1989, the UN created the Special 
Rapporteur primarily to deal with the activities of mercenaries in the absence of any 
other procedure to deal with this phenomenon. Even though the Special Rapporteur's 
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focus was the phenomenon of mercenarism, during the last few years of his mandate, the 
Special Rapporteur included the activities of private military companies in his reports.  
 
A clear shift in focus is noticeable in these reports. Whereas earlier reports put private 
military companies outright on the same level as mercenaries, in the 2001 report the 
Special Rapporteur “proposes that the activities of military and security companies 
should be regulated, limiting their activities in this field to areas that are not inherent to 
the very existence of States, while not actually prohibiting the existence of such 
companies. Any law or regulatory mechanism must prohibit the hiring and formation of 
armed units composed of mercenaries”152
 
. Thus, Special Rapporteur no longer puts 
private military companies and mercenaries on the same level, but rather differentiates 
the two by saying that states should prohibit the use of mercenaries by private military 
companies.  
The opinion that private military companies cannot be assumed to be mercenaries was 
later confirmed in UN General Assembly resolution 58/162 of 2004153, where it 
“requests all states to exercise the utmost vigilance against any kind of recruitment, 
training, hiring or financing of mercenaries by private companies offering international 
military consultancy and security services”. UN General Assembly resolutions on 
mercenaries have since consistently repeated this wording154
 
. 
In 2005, a Working Group on mercenaries replaced the mandate of the Special 
Rapporteur. The UN Working Group on the use of mercenaries as a means of violating 
human rights and impeding the exercise of the rights of peoples to self-determination is 
one of the 39 special procedures of the UN Human rights Council. It was established 
pursuant to Commission on Human Rights resolution 2005/2155
                                                   
152 Report to the 57th session of the Commission on Human Rights, Report on the use of mercenaries as a 
means of violating human rights and impeding the exercise of the right of peoples to self-determination of 
2001, E/CN.4/2001/19,  para 68 
. In March 2008, the 
153UN General Assembly resolution A/Res/58/162 of 2004 adopted under the agenda item Use of 
mercenaries as a means of violating human rights and impeding the exercise of the right of peoples to self-
determination,  para 5  
154 See e.g. UN General Assembly Resolutions A/Res/59/178,  A/Res/61/151, A/Res/62/145 and 
A/Res/63/164  
155 See website of the Working Group on mercenaries: available at 












Human Rights Council extended the mandate of the Working Group for a period of three 




“a) To elaborate and present concrete proposals on possible complementary and new 
standards aimed at filling existing gaps, as well as general guidelines or basic principles 
encouraging the further protection of human rights, in particular the right of peoples to self-
determination, while facing current and emergent threats posed by mercenaries or mercenary-
related activities;  
 
(b) To seek opinions and contributions from Governments and intergovernmental and non-
governmental organizations on questions relating to its mandate; 
 
(c) To monitor mercenaries and mercenary-related activities in all their forms and manifestations in 
different parts of the world; 
 
(d) To study and identify sources and causes, emerging issues, manifestations and trends regarding 
mercenaries or mercenary-related activities and their impact on human rights, particularly on the 
right of peoples to self-determination; 
 
(e) To monitor and study the effects on the enjoyment of human rights, particularly the right 
of peoples to self-determination, of the activities of private companies offering military 
assistance, consultancy and security services on the international market, and to prepare a 
draft of international basic principles that encourage respect for human rights by those 
companies in their activities.” 
 
The Working Group believes that the initial step required to regulate the activities of 
private military companies and their employees is to establish concrete legal standards 
that would define a juridical framework for their activities158. Where resolution 7/21 of 
the Human Rights Council refers to “gaps that need to be filled”, the Working Group is 
of the opinion that this requires the development of new legal norms159
                                                   
156 Ibid. 
. The Working 
Group opines that new international regulations, most likely in the form of a new 
international convention are needed to bring private military companies out of the legal 
157 Own emphasis added 
















3. Self regulation by the industry and accountability under contract by no 
means provide sufficient guarantees against abuse 
 
In opposition to those who advocate a complete ban on private military companies are 
those who wish to let market forces play out and rely on self-regulation by the industry 
and accountability under contract. However, neither of these options provides sufficient 
guarantees against abuse by private military contractors, nor will these options lead to 
greater clarity on the status of private contractors under international law. 
 
Voluntary agreements by the industry result in self-imposed codes of conduct and 
standards. When carrying out their contracts, private military companies would 
voluntarily conform to these codes and standards161. Clients would then assess conduct 
and compliance of a company with these self-imposed rules before hiring the company 
for a certain service162. Most likely, the participation of companies in self-regulatory 
initiatives is part of a public relations strategy, motivated by the wish to display a 
positive reputation to prospective clients. Furthermore, “peer pressure” within the 
industry could also lead companies to participate in similar voluntary agreements163
 
.  
The International Peace Operations Association (IPOA) has taken such a self-regulatory 
initiative. IPOA is a non-profit trade organization created to support the burgeoning 
private military sector. According to IPOA their mission is to164
 
: 
“Promote high operational and ethical standards of firms active in the peace and stability operations 
industry; to engage in a constructive dialogue and advocacy with policy-makers about the growing 
and positive contribution of these firms to the enhancement of international peace, development 
and human security; to provides unique networking and business development opportunities for its 
member companies; and to inform the concerned public about the activities and role of the industry. 
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IPOA is committed to raising the standards of the peace and stability operations industry to ensure 
sound and ethical professionalism and transparency in the conduct of peacekeeping and post-
conflict reconstruction activities. 
 
All member companies subscribe to the IPOA Code of Conduct, which represents a constructive 
effort towards better regulating private sector operations in conflict and post-conflict environments. 
It reflects our belief that high standards will both benefit the industry and serve the greater causes 
of peace, development, and human security.” 
 
IPOA’s Code of Conduct “seeks to ensure the ethical standards of IPOA member 
companies operating in conflict and post-conflict environments”165
 
. It sets out a range of 
principles governing the ethics, transparency and accountability of members and 
reaffirms the applicability of human rights law and international humanitarian law to 
these companies. 
A similar, albeit national, initiative is The British Association of Private Security 
Companies (BAPSC), which “works to promote the interests and regulate the activities 
of UK based firms that provide armed defensive security services in countries outside 
the UK166”. The BAPSC Charter states167
 
: 
“The Members of the Association shall provide such services with high professional skill and 
expertise whilst recognizing that the countries where they are operating may have inadequate legal 
frameworks. The Members note that their activities will be enhanced by an active and transparent 
involvement with International Organizations, governments and private and public bodies that 
share common interests. They agree to follow all rules of international, humanitarian and human 
rights law that are applicable as well as all relevant international protocols and conventions and 
further agree to subscribe to and abide by the ethical codes of practice of the Association”.  
 
Even though a range of companies maintain that voluntary codes are a valuable system 
of oversight, it must be acknowledged that “these practices are often restricted to the 
national boundaries of developed societies where intense competition, rather than a 
                                                   
165 English version of the Code of Conduct available at http://www.ipoaworld.org/eng/codeofconduct/87-
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sense of social obligation, has seen corporations adopting social responsibility ethos to 
advance their competitive edge in the market”168. Leaving companies to self-regulate 
when they operate in areas affected by armed conflict, and in states with a weak justice 
system, will not provide adequate guarantees against abuse169
 
.  
Growth and profit remain the main motivating factors for competitive companies. 
Hence, companies will assess whether they ultimately benefit from establishing a code 
of conduct, or whether the profit opportunities offered by non-compliance are 
superior170. Companies operating in unregulated marketplaces, affected by conflict, 
might attach higher market value to non-compliance with these standards171
 
.  
In addition, the only sanction for breach of the voluntary code that is available to a trade 
association such as IPOA is the removal of the company that is in breach from the 
association. Unless states or international organizations back up voluntary codes with 
sanctions, these codes have little value172. While companies might proclaim to adhere to 
the standards contained in a voluntary code, and participate in the drafting process 
thereof to enhance their public image, without real sanctions “voluntary codes might 
give the cover of prior untested compliance without any real commitment to punishment 
if the rules are broken”173
 
. 
Contracts are available as an alternative tool for private military companies, 
governments and other organizations who seek to prevent military contractor abuse and 
who seek to clarify the status of these contractors174
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and can include certain specific terms such as training and accreditation requirements175
 
. 
Whereas contracts are a potentially useful instrument to enhance clarity on legal matters 
surrounding private military companies, there is no guarantee that a company will 
comply with the terms of the contract176. As is the case with voluntary codes, 
compliance and enforceability problems arise if one relies solely on contracts to regulate 
this matter. Whereas reputation might be a motivating factor to comply, firms might 
choose non-compliance with the contract over compliance, depending on the costs such 
a decision ensues177. In addition, if a contract fails to establish effective oversight and 
implementation mechanism, the enforcement of these contracts is difficult. Furthermore, 
it is questionable whether persons who were not a party to the original contract would 
have the right to sue under the contract178. It would be difficult for these contracts to 
create third party beneficiary rights and in most cases, only one of the contracting parties 
could enforce the terms of the agreement179. Yet, the victims of private military 
contractor abuse are often third parties who should be able to make private claims180
 
. 
Consequently, both self-regulatory options and accountability under contract provide 
inadequate protection against private contractor abuse. Neither option provides for the 
much-needed clarity concerning private contractor status and the consequences attached 
thereto. Hence, they are not sufficient as “stand-alone” accountability measures. 
However, both could serve as an avenue of reform accompanying broader reform 
measures on the international level. 
 
4. National regulations cannot fill the regulatory gap 
 
An inherent problem to domestic regulation is that smaller states might not have the 
power or the means to face up to these companies181
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wherewithal, such regulation is always difficult, especially given the extraterritoriality 
issues that are set out below182. Furthermore, as these companies often work in weak or 
failed states with a feeble justice system, it might be hard to monitor them properly183
 
. 
A number of states, notably South Africa, the United States and the United Kingdom, 
have domestic regulations in place that regulate private military companies. However, 
these domestic regulations do not remedy the lack of accountability in the private 
military sector, as the sector is transnational in nature184. Domestic regulation will rarely 
reach all of a private military company's activities or personnel because these companies 
often operate abroad or draw personnel from third states185. In order for domestic 




Furthermore, private military companies can relocate themselves in order to circumvent 
domestic legislation or escape prosecution187. Domestic legislation that is too tight 
forces companies out of the state where they were originally incorporated188. An 
example of this is the private military company Executive Outcomes, originally based in 
South Africa. After South Africa passed the Regulation of Foreign Military Assistance 
Act189, Executive Outcomes went officially out of business and reconfigured itself while 
altering its modus operandi190. Even though the South African Act suffered from major 
enforcement problems, and South Africa later had to introduce new legislation191 to deal 
with private military companies, this case illustrates the ability of private military 
companies to move to a state with less stringent domestic regulations. Such actions may 
create a “race to the bottom”192
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individual states alone is not sufficient. 
 
In addition, even if private military contractors fall within the reach of a country’s 
national legislation, and the private military company does not try to remove itself from 
this reach, possible enforcement issues are in turn also often of an extraterritorial 
nature193. Unless states make coordinating efforts to ensure enforceability in any country 
other than the home state, private military companies can easily evade domestic 
regulations or liability mechanisms being enforced against them194
 
.  
5. Adapting the mercenary conventions is both undesirable and 
unworkable 
 
Some authors submit that a possible approach to remedy the lack of clarity surrounding 
private military companies would be for the international community to adapt the 
international mercenary conventions. However, this approach seems both unworkable, 
given the limited support that these conventions have obtained, and undesirable, given 
the specific context for which these conventions were drafted. 
 
Indeed, the contemporary image and concept of mercenarism only came into focus 
during the process of decolonization195. Even so, it was not so much the phenomenon of 
mercenarism that was condemned, but rather the support that colonial governments 
received from mercenaries in an attempt to oppose national liberalization struggles196. 
The international community passed most of the regulations, resolutions, and 
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In 1968, the UN General Assembly adopted Resolution 2465 on “the Granting of 
Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples”198, which tried to make the use of 
mercenaries “against movements for national liberation and independence” a criminal 
act. In 1973, the UN General Assembly adopted Resolution 3103 on basic principles of 
the legal status of the combatants struggling against colonial and alien domination and 
racist regimes199, which also aptly illustrates that states addressed the issue of 
mercenarism mainly in the context of (post-) colonial Africa200
 
: 
“The use of mercenaries by colonial and racist regimes against the national liberation movements 
struggling for their freedom and independence from the yoke of colonialism and alien domination 




In this same context, the UN Security Council also issued a number of incident-specific 
resolutions relating to mercenaries202. For example, the Security Council condemned 




Because of the use of mercenaries in the colonial context, many powerful Western states 
originally opposed the regulation of mercenarism and very few states took part in the 
mercenary conventions204. Equally because of the period in which these international 
instruments came into being their definitions are particularly difficult to apply to the 
majority of private military contractors. The existing regulations specifically address 
individuals working against national governments or national liberation movements205
 
.  
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Attempts by the Special Rapporteur and the Working Group on mercenaries to adapt the 
mercenary definition and to obtain universal adherence to the UN mercenary convention 
have hitherto been unsuccessful. Following two expert meetings on traditional and new 
forms of mercenary activities as a means of violating human rights and impeding the 
exercise of the right of peoples to self-determination, held in Geneva in 2001 and 




            “For the purposes of the present Convention, 
 
1. A mercenary is any person who: 
 
(a) Is specially recruited locally or abroad in order to participate in an armed conflict or in any of 
the crimes set forth in article 3 of this Convention; 
(b) Is neither a national of a party to the conflict nor a resident of territory controlled by a party to 
the conflict or of the country in which the crime is committed. An exception is made for a national 
of the country affected by the crime, when the national is hired to commit the crime in his country 
of nationality and uses his status as national to conceal the fact that he is being used as a mercenary 
by the State or organization that hires him. Nationality obtained fraudulently is excluded; 
(c) Is motivated to participate in an armed conflict by profit or the desire for private gain; 
(d) Does not form part of the regular armed forces or police forces at whose side the person fights 
or of the State in whose territory the concerted act of violence is perpetrated. Similarly, has not 
been sent by a State which is not a party to the conflict on official duty as a member of its armed 
forces. 
 
2. A mercenary is also any person who, in any other situation: 
 
(a) Is specially recruited locally or abroad for the purpose of participating in a 
concerted act of violence aimed at: 
 
(i) Overthrowing a government or otherwise undermining the constitutional, legal, 
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economic or financial order or the valuable natural resources of a State; or 
 (ii) Undermining the territorial integrity and basic territorial infrastructure of a State; 
 (iii) Committing an attack against the life, integrity or security of persons or committing 
terrorist acts; 
     (iv) Denying self-determination or maintaining racist regimes or foreign occupation; 
 
(b) Is neither a national of a party to the conflict nor a resident of territory controlled by a party to 
the conflict or of the country in which the crime is committed. An exception is made for a national 
of the country affected by the crime, when the national is hired to commit the crime in his country 
of nationality and uses his status as national to conceal the fact that he is being used as a mercenary 
by the State or organization that hires him. Nationality obtained fraudulently is excluded; 
(c) Is motivated to participate in an armed conflict by profit or the desire for private gain; 
(d) Does not form part of the regular armed forces or police forces at whose side the person fights 
or of the State in whose territory the concerted act of violence is perpetrated. Similarly, has not 
been sent by a State which is not a party to the conflict on official duty as a member of its armed 
forces.” 
 
With the amendments, the Special Rapporteur, inter alia, sought to clarify the nationality 
requirement and to prevent those wishing to avoid accountability from abusing this 
condition208. He also sought to simplify the requirement of motive and especially the 
excessive gain requirement and widen the scope of activity in which mercenaries might 
be involved in armed conflict, beyond direct fighting209
 
. 
Most notably, the proposed definition did not directly address private military 
companies. After further discussion on the issue in a third meeting of experts210 and in 
the subsequent reports of the Special Rapporteur, the Working Group concluded that a 
new international convention on the regulation of the private military industry is 
needed211
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universal instrument dedicated to addressing mercenarism, it also recognizes that many 
activities performed by private military companies do not easily fall under this 
definition212. Hence, regulating private military companies based on the UN mercenary 
convention alone is impossible, even after any potential amendment of this 
convention213. The UN should elaborate and adopt a new international legal instrument 
in the format of a new convention on private military companies214
 
. 
Indeed, given the specific context for which the mercenary conventions were drafted, 
and the limited participation therein, extending these instruments to include private 
military companies seems unlikely to be a successful way of regulating these companies. 
However, the there is still a role to be played by the UN mercenary convention in 
preventing the use of mercenaries as a means of violating human rights and the rights of 
peoples to self-determination215
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private military companies should contain the prohibition for these companies to hire 
mercenaries. As a result, fine-tuning the definition of what constitutes a mercenary will 
also indirectly influence the regulation of private military companies. 
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Chapter IV:  Regulatory options when adopting a new convention 




The benefits of addressing the privatization of security at the international level are 
clear, given the transnational nature of companies themselves, their fields of operation, 
the identity of clients and the effects of privatization216
 
. This chapter will broadly lay out 
the issues a new international “Convention on Private Military Companies” should, as a 
minimum, address.  
On the outset of this chapter, it is important to note that a number of states elaborated a 
draft “International Convention on Private Military and Security Companies” (Draft 
Convention) for the purpose of a two-day regional consultation for the Eastern European 
Group and Central Asian Region, carried out by the UN Working Group on the use of 
mercenaries217
 
. I will reference the Draft Convention where suitable. 
A first element to consider in an attempt to regulate private military companies is to 
establish which actors should fall under the definition of private military company and 
therefore which firms need regulation218. As set out above, the new convention should 
contain a broad definition, as limiting the definition might go against the purpose of 
international humanitarian law. In setting out to define private military companies, the 
new convention could prescribe a definition similar to the one used in this thesis. For 
clarity purposes, I will repeat that definition here219
 
: 
“Private military companies are commercial enterprises that: 
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- offer services directly involving the exercise of force by military means; 
- offer services potentially involving the exercise of force by military means; 
- transfer or enhance the potential to exercise force by military means to clients.” 
 
Over-regulating the matter will deter states from becoming a state party to the 
convention and will lead private military companies to advocate against the elaboration 
of regulation at the international level. The convention should therefore contain a 
minimum of rules that provide a maximum of clarity in those areas that need external 
legal instruction in the form of an international convention220
 
.  
In this chapter, I argue that a system of international operating licenses should be 
established which dictates which private military companies can operate legally in the 
international arena and which companies cannot. The new convention should further 
include specific provisions requiring respect for humanitarian law and provisions 
ensuring that possible transgressions by private military companies do not remain 
without punishment. Further, the convention should include a list of activities that these 
companies cannot exercise and that remain the sole prerogative of the state. Most 
importantly, private military companies should be prohibited from taking a direct part in 
hostilities, unless when they are incorporated in a state’s army or when deployed as UN 
forces.  In addition, lack of compliance with these rules should lead to criminal 
responsibility of both private military contractors and the companies themselves and to 
possible loss of a company’s international operating license. 
 
2. Issues the convention has to address 
a. International licensing regime 
 
The previous chapter demonstrates that one of the problems with regulating private 
military companies at the national level is the creation of a “race to the bottom” whereby 
private military companies seek to relocate themselves in the state that has the least 
stringent regulation in place. This problem would not exist to the same extent if the 
                                                   












international convention would impose all states to introduce a national licensing 
regime. The Draft Convention proposes a system of national licenses combined with 
national registration221
 
. However, in all likelihood the implementation of such a regime 
will differ highly from state to state. In light of seeking the greatest possible 
transparency, it seems that setting up an international licensing system would be the best 
regulatory option to adopt in the new convention.  
Setting up such an international licensing regime will allow distinguishing the legitimate 
company from the lone mercenary222. A body set up under the UN could keep a register 
of private military companies that conform to agreed standards of operation and thereby 
“accredit” such companies with a certain degree of legitimacy223
 
. For a company to 
qualify for a license, it should meet a number of basic requirements. These include, but 
do not have to be restricted to, vetting of private military employee backgrounds and 
private military company modus operandi. The license would allow the company to 
operate as such, rather than requiring a license for each single contract.  
The costs of setting up such a licensing regime have to considered when designing a new 
convention224.  Even though this thesis will not discuss the economics in detail, the costs 
of the licensing regime will influence the type of regime that states are likely to favor, 
and the success thereof225. Some experts argue in favor of a complex, multi-layered 
licensing system where each individual contract requires a license in addition to the 
company having a general operating license226
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by firms applying for or carrying an international license227
 
. 
After adopting the convention, individual states would still have the option to impose 
additional national licensing or registration requirements. Whereas the international 
operating license would be a minimum requirement for the legality of operations of 
private military companies, requiring national registration for individual contracts, for 
example, could enhance transparency and could help states in carrying out their other 
obligations under the convention, such as ensuring that violations of international 
humanitarian law are not left unpunished. 
 
b. Specific provisions requiring respect for international humanitarian 
law  
 
Common article one to the Geneva Conventions requires states “to respect and to ensure 
respect for the present Convention in all circumstances”228. As such, the obligation to 
respect and ensure respect applies to international conflicts and to non-international 
conflicts.  The obligation to respect and to ensure respect for humanitarian law is a two-
fold obligation. “To respect” requires a state to do everything in its power to ensure that 
everyone under its authority respects the rules of international humanitarian law229. “To 
ensure respect” means that states must do everything in their means to ensure that the 
rules of international humanitarian law are respected by all others, especially by those 
actively participating in a conflict230
 
. 
It follows that states are already under an obligation to ensure that private military 
companies comply with international humanitarian law. This obligation is apparent when 
states make use of the services of private military companies, but might not be entirely 
clear when private military companies merely operate from within the jurisdiction of the 
state. To ensure respect of common article one to the Geneva Conventions, the new 
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convention should reiterate this obligation for states, particularly in respect to private 
military companies. 
 
In addition, the convention should specifically require private military companies to 
adhere to the rules of international humanitarian law. The Draft Convention does provide 
for such an obligation where it states that231
 
: 
“The personnel of private military and security companies providing military and security services 
in the territory of the foreign state has to observe the norms of international humanitarian law, 
above all as set out in the Geneva Conventions from August 12, 1949 and in the Additional 
Protocols from July 8, 1944 and strictly adhere to the norms and standards of ensuring human 
rights and freedoms.” 
 
Furthermore, private military companies should be obliged to provide their personnel 
with training in international humanitarian law232. It would not suffice to rely on earlier 
training employees might have received in previous careers233
 
. Failure to do so could 
accrue in criminal responsibility of the company and possible loss of a company’s 
international operating license.  
c. List of excluded activities 
 
In addition to containing provisions requiring states and private military companies to 
respect international humanitarian law, the convention should contain a list of activities a 
private military company cannot, or can under limited circumstances, engage in. The 
Working Group on mercenaries has suggested that states should agree on a list of 
activities in the military and security sphere that are non-outsourceable to the private 
sector and remain a prerogative of the state234
 
. 
Firstly, the convention should contain a prohibition for private military companies to 
                                                   
231 Article 18.5 of the Draft Convention on Private Military and Security Companies, supra note 217 
232 E.C. Gillard, supra note 106, at 7 
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hire mercenaries. As set out above235, the ongoing attempts to adapt the UN mercenary 
convention will be important in light of this prohibition. The convention would only 
allow private military companies to use properly vetted employees who do not qualify as 
mercenaries. The Working Group on mercenaries has suggested that such a prohibition 
could be linked to a prohibition for private military companies to participate in 
overthrowing legitimate governments and political authorities236. In addition, the Draft 
Convention proposes that a provision be included which invites states to consider 
ratification of the UN mercenary convention237
 
. 
Secondly, private military companies should be prohibited from engaging in activities 
that amount to direct participation in hostilities, except for when they are either formally 
incorporated in a state’s army or when they are deployed by the UN238. I will discuss 
both of these exceptions in more detail below239
 
. In addition, the new convention should 
specify that the prohibition to take a direct part in hostilities does not amount to a loss of 
the right of self-defense, which would remain a legitimate exception to the use of force 
by private military contractors. 




“Each State Party shall take such legislative and other measures as may be necessary to prohibit 
private military and security companies and their personnel to directly participate in armed 
conflicts of international or non-international character in the territory of any state, in military 
actions or in terrorist acts aimed at: 
- Overthrow of legitimate governments or undermining in any way of constitutional order, legal, 
economic, financial bases of the state; 
- Coercive change of internationally acknowledged borders of the state; 
- Violation of sovereignty, support of foreign occupation of a part or the whole territory of state; 
- Encroachment on the life, physical immunity or security of physical persons, 
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- Acts of terrorism, 
- Establishment of control over the natural resources of the state; 
- Coercive extrusion of population from areas of permanent residence.” 
 
By the introduction of a provision that prohibits private military companies to take a 
direct part in hostilities it becomes apparent that private contractors are, in principle, 
civilians under international humanitarian law. As civilian do not have the so-called 
“combatant’s privilege” they are not allowed to participate in hostilities241
 
.  
Lastly, other activities associated to private military companies, such as illicit arms 
brokering, could be included in the list of excluded activities. Even though arms 
brokering activities can be a legitimate part of the international arms trade, some 
unscrupulous brokers have exploited the current lack of controls to facilitate arms 
transfers to regions of instability and governments and rebel groups under international 
arms embargoes242. At the UN level, efforts to regulate illicit brokering are currently 
underway243. Any acquisition, import, export or possession of weapons by private 
military companies should be legitimate. The new convention could make further 
exclusions with reference to the United Nations Convention against Transnational 
Organized Crime244 and its relevant protocols, including the Protocol against the Illicit 
Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms, Their Parts and Components and 
Ammunition245 and the Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, 
Especially Women and Children246. Whereas the Draft Convention does refer to the 
prevention of illicit trafficking in firearms247
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might be desirable to include all the fore-mentioned legal instruments in the new 
convention. 
 
d. Obligation for states to incorporate in the army 
 
The new convention would contain a general prohibition for private military companies 
to participate in combat, except for when formally incorporated in a state’s army.  
Hence, any state wishing to employ a private military contractor whose employees are 
likely to engage in combat would integrate those individuals into its armed forces 
through its normal recruitment procedures248
 
.  
States seem reluctant to incorporate private military contractors in their armies out of 
concern of consequences if private military contractors commit abuse. However, even 
without incorporating private contractors into the army, states cannot absolve themselves 
of their responsibilities by hiring private contractors249. States bear responsibility for 
violations of international humanitarian law that are attributable to them and cannot 
escape accountability because a private company carries out a given activity250
 
. 
The Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts of 2001 
reaffirm state responsibility for state organs and agents in the following manner251
 
: 
“Article 5. Conduct of persons or entities exercising elements of governmental authority: 
The conduct of a person or entity which is not an organ of the State under article 4 but which is 
empowered by the law of that State to exercise elements of the governmental authority shall be 
considered an act of the State under international law, provided the person or entity is acting in that 
capacity in the particular instance. 
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Article 8. Conduct directed or controlled by a State: 
The conduct of a person or group of persons shall be considered an act of a State under 
international law if the person or group of persons is in fact acting on the instructions of, or under 
the direction or control of that State in carrying out the conduct.” 
 
Even though the issue of state responsibility is a complex one and falls outside the scope 
of thesis, it is apparent that states already bear responsibility for the actions of private 
military companies they employ. Hence, introducing a requirement to incorporate these 
private military contractors in their armies if they wish to deploy them in situations of 
armed combat is not excessive and will enhance clarity as to the rules of international 
humanitarian law that are applicable to them. Private military contractors will clearly 
qualify as combatants in international armed conflicts when states incorporate them in 
the army. Any act amounting to direct participation in hostilities without having the 
required incorporation in the army would then be illegal. 
 
Furthermore, even though the status of combatant does not exist in non-international 
armed conflict, after incorporation into the army, the rules and regulations applicable to 
these contractors will be the same as those applicable to regular armed forces belonging 
to a state. This inclusion will facilitate prosecution in cases of abuse, and will enhance 
overall transparency. 
 
e. The special case of UN use of private military contractors 
 
A second exception to the rule prohibiting private military contractors to engage in 
combat would be the case where the UN employs private military contractors to form 
part of one of its missions. 
 
The UN has already made use of private military contractors in an auxiliary role for 
logistics or security252.  As already touched upon in the previous chapter253
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, the UN 
could potentially benefit from using private military companies more extensively, 












especially given the difficulties the UN faces in deploying troops. An independent report 
on UN peacekeeping missions (Brahimi report) indicates that UN missions indeed face a 
host of problems, ranging from slow deployment to under-equipment of troops and 
organizational problems254. The report indicates that developed economies contribute 
increasingly fewer troops to UN missions and that developing countries end up sending 
troops instead. These troops sometimes lack rifles, helmets or transport capability255. 
Furthermore, both troops from developed and developing states might be untrained in 




Before entering into any further detail on the UN use of private military contractors, it is 
important to lay out broadly the different types of missions that UN troops engage in and 
the law that is applicable to these troops. The different types of UN missions are 
commonly known as peace-making operations, peacekeeping operations, peace-building 
operations and peace-enforcement operations257. The boundaries between the various 
types of operations have become increasingly blurred and the use of force by UN 
missions might occur in various situations, if authorized by the Security Council258. In 
addition, the extent of the applicability of international humanitarian law to UN troops 
has been the subject of much debate. For the purpose of this thesis, it is important to 
point out the following two documents: the Convention on the Safety of United Nations 
and Associated Personnel259 which reaffirms that UN troops are protected under 
international humanitarian law, and the UN Secretary-General's Bulletin: Observance by 
United Nations Forces of International Humanitarian Law260
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forces should respect international humanitarian law. The principles contained in the 
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latter document are reaffirmed in the Brahimi report, and more recently, in a document 
nicknamed the Capstone Doctrine, which sets out principles and guidelines for UN 
peacekeeping operations261
 
. However, neither the bulletin, nor the Brahimi report or the 
Capstone Doctrine is a legally enforceable document. Hence, to date no legally binding 
rule explicitly subjects UN troops to international humanitarian law. 
The new convention on private military companies should explicitly provide for the 
possibility of UN use of private military contractors, both in support functions as well as 
in combat functions. Where private military contractors participate in a UN mission, 
they would be entitled to participate in hostilities to the extent that the Security Council 
authorizes such participation. Private contractors employed by the UN would thus be 
civilians or combatants under international humanitarian law, depending on the 
specifications given in the Security Council mandate. If a UN mission is allowed to use 
lethal force in personal self-defense only, and if the UN forces do not exceed this 
mandate, all the protections international humanitarian law offers to civilians would 
apply262
 
. In addition to allowing UN use of private military companies, the new 
convention should unambiguously state that private military contractors employed by 
the UN are bound by the principles and rules of international humanitarian law. 
f. Obligation for states to ensure violations of international law by 
private military contractors are punished 
 
If private military contractors commit violations of international humanitarian law, these 
typically take place abroad, which might lead to extraterritorial jurisdiction problems. 
The exercise of extraterritorial jurisdiction might give rise to sovereignty concerns, as 
states might risk interfering in another state’s domestic affairs263
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presumably exercise universal jurisdiction over the commission of certain “universal 
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meaning of universal jurisdiction remains controversial264. While the Geneva 
Conventions contain provisions explicitly conferring universal jurisdiction upon states to 
either prosecute or extradite the presumed perpetrators of grave breaches of the 
conventions, state practice as to this aut dedere aut judicare provision is uneven265
 
. 
Hence, trials for private military company transgressions have rarely taken place. 
The International Criminal Court could potentially remedy this lack of of enforcement at 
the national level. However, thus far the Court has not conducted any investigations into 
private military contractor misconduct. In addition, the International Criminal Court 
does not have truly universal jurisdiction266. According to Article 12 of the Rome 
Statute, the Court can only exercise jurisdiction if crimes were committed by: a national 
of a state party to the statute, on the territory of a state party to the statute, or if a state 
voluntarily accepts the exercise of jurisdiction by the Court over a certain situation267
 
. 
Some states that use private military companies extensively, notably the United States, 
are not a party to the Rome statute. Those states not a party to the Statute reject the 
assertion that the International Criminal Court has jurisdiction over the nationals of non-
consenting states268
 
. The United Sates for example, has even adopted special legislation 
shielding Americans from prosecution before the International Criminal Court, which is 
known as the American Service-members’ Protection Act of 2002. Clearly, merely 
relying on the International Criminal Court to remedy the lack of judicial action at the 
national level will thus not resolve the lack of enforcement of the laws applicable to 
private military companies. 
The new convention should contain a general aut dedere aut judicare provision in the 
style of the one contained in the Geneva Conventions and in Additional Protocol I269
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that reiterates the obligation of all states to prosecute or extradite private military 
contractors and companies who have committed abuses of international humanitarian 
law. The inclusion of such a provision will help ease sovereignty concerns when states 
exercise extraterritorial jurisdiction270. The obligation to extradite or to prosecute should 
apply whether the alleged perpetrations of international humanitarian law were 
committed locally or abroad, and regardless of the nationality of the offender or of the 
company. Hence, the provision would entail true universal jurisdiction. Nonetheless, the 
convention should contain a provision mitigating this broad assertion of jurisdiction by 
the introduction of a complementarity principle. The exercise of extraterritorial 
jurisdiction should remain a “reserve tool” in the fight against impunity of private 
military contractors, and should only apply where the justice system of the country that 
was home to the violations is unable or unwilling to do so271
 
. After it has been 
established that the home state is unable or unwilling to prosecute, states having the 
closest link to the crimes committed should preferentially try offenders over other states. 
g. Punishments available to private military companies 
 
Whereas it is clear that private military employees can incur criminal responsibility for 
their actions, the new convention should extend the possibility to impose criminal 
sanctions to the companies themselves. Even though criminal law does not exactly apply 
to corporations as it does to natural persons, hosts of legal systems do allow a 
corporation to be held criminally liable for crimes that have been committed by its 
agents272. In the case of private military companies, individual actors could incur fines 
or imprisonment, while the company could be punished financially and loose its 
international operating license273
                                                                                                                                                      
Protocol I. 
. By introducing a full range of criminal sanctions for 
both individual actors and companies, the convention would guarantee maximum 
accountability. As some states might have a different interpretation of the ne bis in idem 
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principle in criminal law, the extent to which both company and individual actor could 















In this thesis I began from the premise that the private military industry, a relatively new 
industry, is apparently here to stay. Being a new actor in the international field, the 
regulatory framework surrounding the private military industry is by no means clear. In 
this thesis, I specifically assess the status of private military companies under 
international humanitarian law. Even though these companies do not operate in a legal 
vacuum, certain legal “grey zones” do exist, as a result of which certain abuses 
committed by private military companies in the course of their operations have gone 
unpunished. 
 
Because of such allegations, some argue in favor of a complete ban of private military 
companies. However, these companies are used worldwide, and an outright ban would 
be unrealistic. Furthermore, it would be undesirable to ban them completely, as the use 
of these companies holds promise for both states and other international actors.  
 
Examining the international instruments that are applicable to private military 
contractors, it becomes clear that these contractors are either combatants or civilians 
under international humanitarian law. In limited circumstances they might qualify as 
mercenaries, but it is very unlikely this would be the case, as the legal instruments 
regulating mercenarism were not drafted with the private military industry in mind. 
 
Though private military companies already have a status under international 
humanitarian law, the structure and modus operandi of these companies creates 
difficulties for applying existing humanitarian law provisions, which leaves a “legal 
murkiness” that companies handily exploit. Different regulatory options are advanced by 
different actors: some wish to ban private military companies, some prefer self-
regulation, others would like to fill international regulatory gaps by promulgating 
national regulations and yet others are in favor of adapting the mercenary conventions to 
include private military companies. However, these regulatory options do not clarify the 












higher punishment rate of private military company abuse, making them unsatisfactory. 
 
I defend the view that given the transnational nature of private military companies, their 
fields of operation and their clients, establishing a new convention on private military 
companies would be the best regulatory option. A new convention would clarify the 
status of private military contractors, and could lead to greater respect of international 
humanitarian law through the reaffirmation of certain existing obligations as well as 
through the introduction of new obligations.  
 
A number of states have already endorsed a, albeit non-binding, document on private 
military companies, which reaffirms existing obligations under international 
humanitarian law. This document (known as the Montreux document274) indicates a 
willingness of states to engage in negotiations on the subject. Recently, the Working 
Groups on mercenaries has also come to the conclusion that the development of new 
international regulations, most likely in the form of a new international convention, are 
needed to bring private military companies out of the legal “grey zone”. The Working 
Group is now in the process of establishing shared understanding among states about 
standards for the regulation of the private military industry275
 
. 
The process of consultation and negotiation initiated by the Working Group is certainly a 
valuable one, and I can only hope that this thesis might contribute to the elaboration of 
an effective international convention that is widely embraced by the international 
community276
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